AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF REPUTATION EFFECTS AND NETWORK CENTRALITY IN A MULTI-AGENCY CONTEXT
Signals convey information to marketplace participants regarding the unobservable quality of a product. Whenever product quality if unobservable prior to purchase, there is the risk of adverse selection. Problems of hidden information also occur in the consumer marketplace when the consumer is unabl...
Main Author: | Plant, Emily Jane |
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Format: | Others |
Published: |
UKnowledge
2010
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://uknowledge.uky.edu/gradschool_diss/17 http://uknowledge.uky.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=gradschool_diss |
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