Asymmetric Information in Common-Value Auctions and Contests: Theory and Experiments

Asymmetric Information in Common-Value Auctions and Contests: Theory and Experiments

In common-value auctions and contests economic agents often have varying levels of information regarding the value of the good to be allocated. Using theoretical and experimental analysis, I examine the effect of such information asymmetry on behavior. Chapter II considers a model in which players c...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Rentschler, Lucas Aaren
Other Authors: Sarin, Rajiv
Format: Others
Language:en_US
Published: 2011
Subjects:
Auctions
Asymmetric Information
Contests
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2010-08-8270

Internet

http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2010-08-8270

Similar Items