Revising control and aligning interests : A case study of a headquarters shifting control exertion on a foreign subsidiary

In this study, a process in which a headquarters was changing its way and extent of control exertion on a foreign subsidiary was investigated from an agency theoretical perspective. Two particular characteristics of principal-agent relationships were particularly scrutinized; information asymmetry a...

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Main Author: Ekberg, Erik
Format: Others
Language:English
Published: Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen 2013
Subjects:
Online Access:http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-209087
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spelling ndltd-UPSALLA1-oai-DiVA.org-uu-2090872013-10-19T04:35:33ZRevising control and aligning interests : A case study of a headquarters shifting control exertion on a foreign subsidiaryengEkberg, ErikUppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen2013Agency theoryforeign subsidiaryagent problemsinformation asymmetryaligning interestsorganizational interest alignmentcontrolcontrol mechanismsincentivesIn this study, a process in which a headquarters was changing its way and extent of control exertion on a foreign subsidiary was investigated from an agency theoretical perspective. Two particular characteristics of principal-agent relationships were particularly scrutinized; information asymmetry and aligning interests. These issues were investigated in-depth through interviews, direct observations and document analysis, in order to examine whether they were identified by the headquarters as major problems and accordingly triggered the change initiative. The agency theoretical perspective was subsequently related to theories on organizational interest alignment, in order to examine whether the agency theoretical prescriptions on appropriate control mechanisms seemed appropriate with respect to individuals’ motivation to align their interests’ with organizational goals. The findings suggested that hedonic intrinsic motivation, which is achieved through enjoyable, self-decided and competence-enhancing work tasks, played a more important role than extrinsic rewards, which is contrary to agency theory which emphasizes extrinsic incentives. Student thesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesistexthttp://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-209087application/pdfinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
collection NDLTD
language English
format Others
sources NDLTD
topic Agency theory
foreign subsidiary
agent problems
information asymmetry
aligning interests
organizational interest alignment
control
control mechanisms
incentives
spellingShingle Agency theory
foreign subsidiary
agent problems
information asymmetry
aligning interests
organizational interest alignment
control
control mechanisms
incentives
Ekberg, Erik
Revising control and aligning interests : A case study of a headquarters shifting control exertion on a foreign subsidiary
description In this study, a process in which a headquarters was changing its way and extent of control exertion on a foreign subsidiary was investigated from an agency theoretical perspective. Two particular characteristics of principal-agent relationships were particularly scrutinized; information asymmetry and aligning interests. These issues were investigated in-depth through interviews, direct observations and document analysis, in order to examine whether they were identified by the headquarters as major problems and accordingly triggered the change initiative. The agency theoretical perspective was subsequently related to theories on organizational interest alignment, in order to examine whether the agency theoretical prescriptions on appropriate control mechanisms seemed appropriate with respect to individuals’ motivation to align their interests’ with organizational goals. The findings suggested that hedonic intrinsic motivation, which is achieved through enjoyable, self-decided and competence-enhancing work tasks, played a more important role than extrinsic rewards, which is contrary to agency theory which emphasizes extrinsic incentives.
author Ekberg, Erik
author_facet Ekberg, Erik
author_sort Ekberg, Erik
title Revising control and aligning interests : A case study of a headquarters shifting control exertion on a foreign subsidiary
title_short Revising control and aligning interests : A case study of a headquarters shifting control exertion on a foreign subsidiary
title_full Revising control and aligning interests : A case study of a headquarters shifting control exertion on a foreign subsidiary
title_fullStr Revising control and aligning interests : A case study of a headquarters shifting control exertion on a foreign subsidiary
title_full_unstemmed Revising control and aligning interests : A case study of a headquarters shifting control exertion on a foreign subsidiary
title_sort revising control and aligning interests : a case study of a headquarters shifting control exertion on a foreign subsidiary
publisher Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen
publishDate 2013
url http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-209087
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