Cash-to-cash-styrning : ett spelteoretiskt angreppssätt

Cash-to-cash-styrning : ett spelteoretiskt angreppssätt

Objective: The objective is to examine if long terms of payment are created because of a perceived zero-sum game in the cash-to-cash cycles between companies. The study will also examine if dependence effects the dependent companies Cash-to-Cash-cycle because of long terms of payment. Scientific met...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Mangs, Christian, Fernholm, Nicholas
Format: Others
Language:Swedish
Published: Södertörns högskola, Institutionen för samhällsvetenskaper 2015
Subjects:
game theory
cash-to-cash
c2c
supply chain finance
supply chain management
perceived Zero-sum game
pareto effeciency
dominant company
power imbalance
uppfattat nollsummespel
pareto-optimalitet
beroendeförhållande
maktobalans
Online Access:http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-27892

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http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-27892

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