The Effects of Compensation/Audit Committee Overlap, Pay-Performance Sensitivity and IFRSs

碩士 === 國立彰化師範大學 === 財務金融技術學系 === 104 === This study examines how the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) and the director overlapping (defined as overlapping membership on audit and compensation committees) affects the pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) on listed...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: 李易庭
Other Authors: 陳俞如
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2016
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/94814328379842132611
Description
Summary:碩士 === 國立彰化師範大學 === 財務金融技術學系 === 104 === This study examines how the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) and the director overlapping (defined as overlapping membership on audit and compensation committees) affects the pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) on listed companies in Taiwan. Using 2826 firm-year observations over the period 2011-2014, we find that when IFRSs implemented, companies will increase the PPS. However, when take into account the influence of the director overlapping, we find that there will not affect the implementation of IFRSs on the PPS .But without director overlapping, the implementation of IFRSs will enhance the PPS. This findings indicate that the compensation committee which has members involve in the audit committee will increase the doubts and prudence of the financial statements information on compensation decisions. And the design of compensation will be less susceptible by the impact of changes in accounting standards.