| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立成功大學 === 工業與資訊管理學系 === 104 === This thesis studies the pricing and warranty decisions between the manufacturer and retailer under dual channel competition. There are one manufacturer and one retailer who sell the same product to the consumers through their own selling channel. The manufacturer, as the leader of the market, uses the longer base warranty of the product to attract the consumer. And the retailer, as the follower, may consider selling the extended warranty as the strategy to compete with the manufacturer. If the retailer does provide the extended warranty, she can decide the timing of releasing the information of the extended warranty. The demand model is proposed based on consumer utility theory and depends on the consumers’ preferences of the shopping channel and their willingness to pay for the warranty. This study develops three game-theoretic models to analyze the interaction between the manufacturer and the retailer, and find their equilibrium pricing and warranty strategies. The numerical result show that the manufacturer prefers model 1 and the retailer prefers model 3 to obtain their maximum profits. Since the retailer is the follower, model 3 will eventually be adopted in the market. Furthermore, we show how the parametric changes impact the equilibrium results by using parameter analysis, and derive the managerial insights.
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