| Summary: | 博士 === 國立政治大學 === 企業管理學系 === 88 === In agency theory, executive compensation contracts and ownership structures provide primary mechanisms for solving agency problems. Top executive compensation linked to performance can align the incentives of firms'' top executive with firms''stockholder. Ownership structure can influce the effort of the top executive. The main purpose of this study is to examine the relationship among top executive compensation scheme, ownership structure and firm performance for listed companies in Taiwan, and use modelling to develop related propositions and hypotheses.
Pooling regressions using four years'' pool data and Scheffe test are performed to test hypothese, Empirical results are summarized as follows:
1.The holdings of chairman has nothing to do with the level of compsation and that of CEO has something to do with.
2.The non-linear relationship between firm value and holdings of board of directors.
3.The role of institution tends to be efficinet monitoring hypothesis.
4.Incentive component of CEO compensation scheme tends to be more important than level of that sheme.
5.Firm performance is positively associated with top executive''s cash compensation.
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