Limits on Computationally Efficient VCG-Based Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions and Public Projects

Limits on Computationally Efficient VCG-Based Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions and Public Projects

<p>A natural goal in designing mechanisms for auctions and public projects is to maximize the social welfare while incentivizing players to bid truthfully. If these are the only concerns, the problem is easily solved by use of the VCG mechanism. Unfortunately, this mechanism is not computation...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Buchfuhrer, David Isaac
Format: Others
Published: 2011
Online Access:https://thesis.library.caltech.edu/6424/4/buchfuhrer_phd_thesis-final.pdf
Buchfuhrer, David Isaac (2011) Limits on Computationally Efficient VCG-Based Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions and Public Projects. Dissertation (Ph.D.), California Institute of Technology. doi:10.7907/N0M7-C473. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05242011-112814785 <https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05242011-112814785>

Internet

https://thesis.library.caltech.edu/6424/4/buchfuhrer_phd_thesis-final.pdf
Buchfuhrer, David Isaac (2011) Limits on Computationally Efficient VCG-Based Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions and Public Projects. Dissertation (Ph.D.), California Institute of Technology. doi:10.7907/N0M7-C473. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05242011-112814785 <https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05242011-112814785>

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