Incentives and Institutions: Essays in Mechanism Design and Game Theory with Applications
<p>In the first part of this dissertation we study the problem of designing desirable mechanisms for economic environments with different types of informational and consumption externalities. We first study the mechanism design problem for the class of Bayesian environments where preferences o...
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https://thesis.library.caltech.edu/1484/1/Kucuksenel_Thesis.pdfKucuksenel, Serkan (2009) Incentives and Institutions: Essays in Mechanism Design and Game Theory with Applications. Dissertation (Ph.D.), California Institute of Technology. doi:10.7907/EAZA-N950. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-04232009-163542 <https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-04232009-163542>