Signaling Games: Theory and Applications
<p>This thesis concerns the interactions between asymmetrically informed agents where information can potentially be transmitted through the actions of the agents. Refinements of the sequential equilibrium concept are derived and applied to (i) a model of pretrial bargaining between litigants...
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| Format: | Others |
| Language: | en |
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1986
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| Online Access: | https://thesis.library.caltech.edu/11463/2/Banks_JS_1986.pdf Banks, Jeffrey Scott (1986) Signaling Games: Theory and Applications. Dissertation (Ph.D.), California Institute of Technology. doi:10.7907/hhm5-8h24. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:04152019-112738556 <https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:04152019-112738556> |
Internet
https://thesis.library.caltech.edu/11463/2/Banks_JS_1986.pdfBanks, Jeffrey Scott (1986) Signaling Games: Theory and Applications. Dissertation (Ph.D.), California Institute of Technology. doi:10.7907/hhm5-8h24. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:04152019-112738556 <https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:04152019-112738556>