Optimal Lower Bounds for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms

We consider the problem of designing truthful mechanisms on m unrelated machines, to minimize some optimization goal. Nisan and Ronen [Nisan, N., A. Ronen. 2001. Algorithmic mechanism design. Games Econom. Behav. 35 166-196] consider the specific goal of makespan minimization, and show a lower bound...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Ashlagi, Itai (Contributor), Dobzinski, Shahar (Author), Lavi, Ron (Author)
Other Authors: Sloan School of Management (Contributor)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS), 2014-06-02T16:25:26Z.
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