Menu Pricing and Learning

We analyze the design of dynamic menus to sell experience goods. The quality of the product is initially unknown, and the total quantity sold in each period determines the amount of information in the market. We characterize the optimum menu as a function of consumers' beliefs, and the dynamic...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Bonatti, Alessandro (Contributor)
Other Authors: Sloan School of Management (Contributor)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: American Economic Association, 2011-09-21T17:13:51Z.
Subjects:
Online Access:Get fulltext
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100 1 0 |a Bonatti, Alessandro  |e author 
100 1 0 |a Sloan School of Management  |e contributor 
100 1 0 |a Bonatti, Alessandro  |e contributor 
100 1 0 |a Bonatti, Alessandro  |e contributor 
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520 |a We analyze the design of dynamic menus to sell experience goods. The quality of the product is initially unknown, and the total quantity sold in each period determines the amount of information in the market. We characterize the optimum menu as a function of consumers' beliefs, and the dynamic adjustments resulting from the diffusion of information. The firm faces a dynamic trade-off between gains from trade, information production, and information rents. It initially charges lower prices, sacrificing short-term revenue to increase sales. As more information is revealed, prices increase, and low-valuation buyers are excluded, even when the product's quality is high. 
520 |a Carl A. Anderson Fellowship 
520 |a Leylan Fellowship in the Social Sciences 
546 |a en_US 
655 7 |a Article 
773 |t American Economic Journal: Microeconomics