Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness

Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness

We design a Generalized Position Auction for players with private values and private budget constraints. Our mechanism is a careful modification of the Generalized English Auction of Edelman, Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2007). By enabling multiple price trajectories that ascent concurrently we are able t...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Ashlagi, Itai (Contributor), Braverman, Mark (Author), Hassidim, Avinatan (Contributor), Lavi, Ron (Author), Tennenholtz, Moshe (Author)
Other Authors: Sloan School of Management (Contributor), W. M. Keck Foundation Center for Extreme Quantum Information Theory (Contributor)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011-06-16T17:43:04Z.
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