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|a Chen, Jing
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|a Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
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|a Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
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|a Micali, Silvio
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|a Chen, Jing
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|a Micali, Silvio
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|a Micali, Silvio
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|a A new approach to auctions and resilient mechanism design
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|b Association for Computing Machinery,
|c 2011-05-20T20:29:31Z.
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|z Get fulltext
|u http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/62861
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|a We put forward a new approach to mechanism design, and exemplify it via a new mechanism guaranteeing significant revenue in unrestricted combinatorial auctions. Our mechanism (1) succeeds in a new and very adversarial collusion model; (2) works in a new, equilibrium-less, and very strong solution concept; (3) benchmarks its performance against the knowledge that the players have about each other; (4) is computationally efficient and preserves the players' privacy to an unusual extent.
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|a Article
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|t ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC). Proceedings ... 2009
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