A new approach to auctions and resilient mechanism design

A new approach to auctions and resilient mechanism design

We put forward a new approach to mechanism design, and exemplify it via a new mechanism guaranteeing significant revenue in unrestricted combinatorial auctions. Our mechanism (1) succeeds in a new and very adversarial collusion model; (2) works in a new, equilibrium-less, and very strong solution co...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Chen, Jing (Contributor), Micali, Silvio (Contributor)
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (Contributor), Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (Contributor)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Association for Computing Machinery, 2011-05-20T20:29:31Z.
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