Learning Multi-Item Auctions with (or without) Samples

© 2017 IEEE. We provide algorithms that learn simple auctions whose revenue is approximately optimal in multi-item multi-bidder settings, for a wide range of bidder valuations including unit-demand, additive, constrained additive, XOS, and subadditive. We obtain our learning results in two settings....

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Cai, Yang (Author), Daskalakis, Constantinos (Author)
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (Contributor), Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (Contributor)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 2021-11-05T15:13:17Z.
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