Equilibrium analysis for a leader-follower game with noisy observations: A pace forward in Witsenhausen's counterexample conjecture

In this paper, we view Witsenhausen's problem as a leader-follower coordination game in which the action of the leader is corrupted by an additive normal noise, before reaching the follower. The leader who observes the realization of the state, chooses an action that minimizes her distance to t...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Ajorlou, Amir (Contributor), Jadbabaie-Moghadam, Ali (Contributor)
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering (Contributor), Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems (Contributor), Jadbabaie, Ali (Contributor)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 2018-02-22T21:43:22Z.
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