TO COMMIT OR NOT TO COMMIT A CRIME. A CRIMINAL NETWORK MODEL AND AN ALGORITHM FOR ITS ANALYSIS

TO COMMIT OR NOT TO COMMIT A CRIME. A CRIMINAL NETWORK MODEL AND AN ALGORITHM FOR ITS ANALYSIS

Here we introduce and investigate a mathematical model of delinquent networks. This problem is formulated in the framework of game theory, one of whose main concepts is the Nash equilibrium. We discuss how the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium leads to a constraint satisfaction problem, and how...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Fredis Agámez, John F. Cantillo, Javier Montoya, John E. Realpe
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Universidad Nacional de Colombia 2017-01-01
Series:Momento
Subjects:
Sistemas complejos
teoría de juegos
modelado computacional
modelos en redes
teoría de probabilidad
redes delincuenciales
mecánica estadística.
Online Access:https://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/momento/article/view/62432

Internet

https://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/momento/article/view/62432

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