Learning, Signaling, and Social Preferences in Public-Good Games

This study compares the empirical performance of a variety of learning models and theories of social preferences in the context of experimental games involving the provision of public goods. Parameters are estimated via maximum likelihood estimation. We also performed estimations to identify differe...

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Main Authors: Marco A. Janssen, T. K. Ahn
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Resilience Alliance 2006-12-01
Series:Ecology and Society
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss2/art21/
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spelling doaj-cf4ad307ff7345fd91ae9bfd9e0b1c542020-11-24T21:02:24ZengResilience AllianceEcology and Society1708-30872006-12-011122110.5751/ES-01752-1102211752Learning, Signaling, and Social Preferences in Public-Good GamesMarco A. Janssen0T. K. Ahn1Arizona State UniversityFlorida State University and Korea UniversityThis study compares the empirical performance of a variety of learning models and theories of social preferences in the context of experimental games involving the provision of public goods. Parameters are estimated via maximum likelihood estimation. We also performed estimations to identify different types of agents and distributions of parameters. The estimated models suggest that the players of such games take into account the learning of others and are belief learners. Despite these interesting findings, we conclude that a powerful method of model selection of agent-based models on dynamic social dilemma experiments is still lacking.http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss2/art21/laboratory experimentspublic goodsagent-based modellearningsocial preferences
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Marco A. Janssen
T. K. Ahn
spellingShingle Marco A. Janssen
T. K. Ahn
Learning, Signaling, and Social Preferences in Public-Good Games
Ecology and Society
laboratory experiments
public goods
agent-based model
learning
social preferences
author_facet Marco A. Janssen
T. K. Ahn
author_sort Marco A. Janssen
title Learning, Signaling, and Social Preferences in Public-Good Games
title_short Learning, Signaling, and Social Preferences in Public-Good Games
title_full Learning, Signaling, and Social Preferences in Public-Good Games
title_fullStr Learning, Signaling, and Social Preferences in Public-Good Games
title_full_unstemmed Learning, Signaling, and Social Preferences in Public-Good Games
title_sort learning, signaling, and social preferences in public-good games
publisher Resilience Alliance
series Ecology and Society
issn 1708-3087
publishDate 2006-12-01
description This study compares the empirical performance of a variety of learning models and theories of social preferences in the context of experimental games involving the provision of public goods. Parameters are estimated via maximum likelihood estimation. We also performed estimations to identify different types of agents and distributions of parameters. The estimated models suggest that the players of such games take into account the learning of others and are belief learners. Despite these interesting findings, we conclude that a powerful method of model selection of agent-based models on dynamic social dilemma experiments is still lacking.
topic laboratory experiments
public goods
agent-based model
learning
social preferences
url http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss2/art21/
work_keys_str_mv AT marcoajanssen learningsignalingandsocialpreferencesinpublicgoodgames
AT tkahn learningsignalingandsocialpreferencesinpublicgoodgames
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