The Evolvability of Cooperation under Local and Non-Local Mutations

The Evolvability of Cooperation under Local and Non-Local Mutations

We study evolutionary dynamics in a population of individuals engaged in pairwise social interactions, encoded as iterated games. We consider evolution within the space of memory-1strategies, and we characterize all evolutionary robust outcomes, as well as their tendency to evolve under the evolutio...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Alexander J. Stewart, Joshua B. Plotkin
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2015-07-01
Series:Games
Subjects:
cooperation
evolvability
adaptive dynamics
iterated games
memory-1 strategies
payoff evolution
evolution of investment
Online Access:http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/6/3/231

Internet

http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/6/3/231

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