Emotions, Experiments and the Moral Brain. The Failure of Moral Cognition Arguments Against Moral Sentimentalism
Moral cognition research has in part been taken to be a problem for moral sentimentalists, who claim that emotions are sensitive to moral information. In particular, Joshua Greene can be understood to provide an argument against moral sentimentalism on the basis of neuropsychological evidence. In hi...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
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Mimesis Edizioni, Milano
2019-04-01
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| Series: | Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia |
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| Online Access: | https://www.rifp.it/ojs/index.php/rifp/article/view/rifp.2019.0002/903 |