DEFENSE-ATTACK INTERACTION OVER OPTIMALLY DESIGNED DEFENSE SYSTEMS VIA GAMES AND RELIABILITY

DEFENSE-ATTACK INTERACTION OVER OPTIMALLY DESIGNED DEFENSE SYSTEMS VIA GAMES AND RELIABILITY

This paper analyzes defense systems taking into account the strategic interactions between two rational agents; one of them is interested in designing a defense system against purposeful attacks of the other. The interaction is characterized by a sequential game with perfect and complete information...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Isis Didier Lins, Paulo Renato Alves Firmino, Diogo de Carvalho Bezerra, Márcio das Chagas Moura, Enrique López Droguett, Leandro Chaves Rêgo, Carlos Renato dos Santos
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Sociedade Brasileira de Pesquisa Operacional 2014-05-01
Series:Pesquisa Operacional
Subjects:
Defense systems configuration
system reliability
sequential games of complete and perfect information
Online Access:http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-74382014000200215&lng=en&tlng=en

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http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-74382014000200215&lng=en&tlng=en

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