Modeling Inequity Aversion in a Dictator Game with Production

Modeling Inequity Aversion in a Dictator Game with Production

We expand upon the previous models of inequity aversion of Fehr and Schmidt [1], and Frohlich et al. [2], which assume that dictators get disutility if the final allocation of surplus deviates from the equal split (egalitarian principle) or from the subjects' production (libertarian princip...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Ismael Rodriguez-Lara, Luis Moreno-Garrido
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2012-10-01
Series:Games
Subjects:
social preferences
inequity aversion
inequality aversion
egalitarian principle
libertarian principle
accountability principle
Online Access:http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/3/4/138

Internet

http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/3/4/138

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