Vaccination Games with Peer Effects in a Heterogeneous Hospital Worker Population

Vaccination Games with Peer Effects in a Heterogeneous Hospital Worker Population

We develop a game theoretic model to analyze the Nash equilibrium of vaccine decisions in a hospital population with heterogeneous contacts. We use the model in conjunction with person-to-person contact data within a large university hospital. We simulate, using agent-based models, the probability o...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Troy Tassier, Philip Polgreen, Alberto Segre
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2015-01-01
Series:Administrative Sciences
Subjects:
vaccination game
computational epidemiology
economic epidemiology
social networks
Online Access:http://www.mdpi.com/2076-3387/5/1/2

Internet

http://www.mdpi.com/2076-3387/5/1/2

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