Do Overconfident CEOs Pay More to Shareholders? Evidence from the US Market

Do Overconfident CEOs Pay More to Shareholders? Evidence from the US Market

This paper aims to discover evidence on the possible impact of CEO overconfidence on payout policy, and the role of corporate boards in offsetting the possible negative effects of this overconfidence. Our investigation demonstrates the effect of overconfidence on the choice of payout method, specifi...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Artem Anilov
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: National Research University Higher School of Economics 2020-06-01
Series:Корпоративные финансы
Subjects:
payout policy
behavioral corporate finance
overconfidence
share repurchases
corporate governance
board of directors
Online Access:https://cfjournal.hse.ru/article/view/10073/10965

Internet

https://cfjournal.hse.ru/article/view/10073/10965

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