R&D outsourcing contract for the unverified value of tacit knowledge sharing

R&D outsourcing contract for the unverified value of tacit knowledge sharing

<p class="Abstract"><strong><em>Purpose:</em></strong> The purpose of this paper is to provide a R&amp;D outsourcing contract design framework to incent R&amp;D outsourcing service providers sharing tacit and explicit knowledge.</p> <p class=&...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Han Song, YuQing Liu, Ying Dai, Jing Zhu
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: OmniaScience 2015-11-01
Series:Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management
Subjects:
R&D Outsourcing, Knowledge Sharing, Tacit Knowledge Value, Principal-Agent, Incentive Contract
Online Access:http://www.jiem.org/index.php/jiem/article/view/1497

Internet

http://www.jiem.org/index.php/jiem/article/view/1497

Similar Items