Sequential decision-making and asymmetric equilibria: an application to takeovers
With indivisible shareholdings and simultaneous shareholder decision-making, the existing takeover literature provides a reasonable profit only in asymmetric equilibria. We allow the raider to approach shareholders sequentially and thereby find a unique equilibrium that produces the same outcome.
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2004-12.
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Get fulltext |
| LEADER | 00679 am a22001333u 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | 47661 | ||
| 042 | |a dc | ||
| 100 | 1 | 0 | |a Gill, David |e author |
| 700 | 1 | 0 | |a Sgroi, Daniel |e author |
| 245 | 0 | 0 | |a Sequential decision-making and asymmetric equilibria: an application to takeovers |
| 260 | |c 2004-12. | ||
| 856 | |z Get fulltext |u https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/47661/1/sequential.pdf | ||
| 520 | |a With indivisible shareholdings and simultaneous shareholder decision-making, the existing takeover literature provides a reasonable profit only in asymmetric equilibria. We allow the raider to approach shareholders sequentially and thereby find a unique equilibrium that produces the same outcome. | ||
| 655 | 7 | |a Article | |