The open method of coordination as a 'two-level game'

One of the most discussed issues surrounding the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) is the way in which it influences national social policies. This article argues that the question of influence is incorrectly posed. Instead, the OMC has to be understood as a 'two-level game' in which membe...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Büchs, M. (Author)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2008-01-01.
Subjects:
Online Access:Get fulltext
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520 |a One of the most discussed issues surrounding the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) is the way in which it influences national social policies. This article argues that the question of influence is incorrectly posed. Instead, the OMC has to be understood as a 'two-level game' in which member state governments and non-governmental actors try to have an impact on the definition of the OMC objectives and, subsequently, strategically and selectively use the OMC in national policy-making processes. This, however, entails problems in terms of the transparency of policy-making processes and the accountability of national governments. 
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