An experimental study of voting with costly delay
A conclave is a voting mechanism in which a committee selects an alternative by voting until a sufficient supermajority is reached. We study experimentally welfare properties of simple three-voter conclaves with privately known preferences over two outcomes and waiting costs. The resulting game is a...
Main Authors: | Kwiek, Maksymilian (Author), Marreiros, Helia (Author), Vlassopoulos, Michael (Author) |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
2016-01-12.
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Get fulltext |
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