Truth is (still) the norm for assertion: a reply to Littlejohn
In a paper in this journal (Erkenntnis 78: 847-867, 2013), I defend the view that truth is the fundamental norm for assertion and, in doing so, reject the view that knowledge is the fundamental norm for assertion. In a recent response, Littlejohn (Erkenntnis 79: 1355-1365, 2014) raises a number of o...
Main Author: | Whiting, Daniel (Author) |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
2015-01.
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Get fulltext |
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