Truth is (still) the norm for assertion: a reply to Littlejohn
In a paper in this journal (Erkenntnis 78: 847-867, 2013), I defend the view that truth is the fundamental norm for assertion and, in doing so, reject the view that knowledge is the fundamental norm for assertion. In a recent response, Littlejohn (Erkenntnis 79: 1355-1365, 2014) raises a number of o...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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2015-01.
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| Online Access: | Get fulltext |
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| 100 | 1 | 0 | |a Whiting, Daniel |e author |
| 245 | 0 | 0 | |a Truth is (still) the norm for assertion: a reply to Littlejohn |
| 260 | |c 2015-01. | ||
| 856 | |z Get fulltext |u https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/373660/1/TruthIsStilltheNormForAssertion%2520-%2520Daniel%2520Whiting%2520-%2520Erkenntnis%25202015.pdf | ||
| 520 | |a In a paper in this journal (Erkenntnis 78: 847-867, 2013), I defend the view that truth is the fundamental norm for assertion and, in doing so, reject the view that knowledge is the fundamental norm for assertion. In a recent response, Littlejohn (Erkenntnis 79: 1355-1365, 2014) raises a number of objections against my arguments. In this reply, I argue that Littlejohn's objections are unsuccessful. | ||
| 655 | 7 | |a Article | |