The glass is half empty: a new argument for pessimism about aesthetic testimony
Call the view that it is possible to acquire aesthetic knowledge via testimony, optimism, and its denial, pessimism. In this paper, I offer a novel argument for pessimism. It works by turning attention away from the basis of the relevant belief, namely, testimony, and toward what that belief in turn...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2015.
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Get fulltext Get fulltext |
| Summary: | Call the view that it is possible to acquire aesthetic knowledge via testimony, optimism, and its denial, pessimism. In this paper, I offer a novel argument for pessimism. It works by turning attention away from the basis of the relevant belief, namely, testimony, and toward what that belief in turn provides a basis for, namely, other attitudes. In short, I argue that an aesthetic belief acquired via testimony cannot provide a rational basis for further attitudes, such as admiration, and that the best explanation for this is that the relevant belief is not itself rational. If a belief is not rational, it is not knowledge. So, optimism is false. After addressing a number of objections to the argument, I consider briefly its bearing on the debate concerning thick evaluative concepts. While the aim to argue that pessimism holds, not to explain why it holds, I provide an indication in closing of what that explanation might be |
|---|