The possibility of unicorns and modal logic
Michael Dummett argues, against Saul Kripke, that there could have been unicorns. He then claims that this possibility shows that the logic of metaphysical modality is not S5, and, in particular, that the B axiom is false. Dummett's argument against B, however, is invalid. I show that although...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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2014.
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| Online Access: | Get fulltext |
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| 001 | 360783 | ||
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| 100 | 1 | 0 | |a Walters, Lee |e author |
| 245 | 0 | 0 | |a The possibility of unicorns and modal logic |
| 260 | |c 2014. | ||
| 856 | |z Get fulltext |u https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/360783/1/The%2520Possibility%2520of%2520Unicorns%2520and%2520Modal%2520Logic.docx | ||
| 520 | |a Michael Dummett argues, against Saul Kripke, that there could have been unicorns. He then claims that this possibility shows that the logic of metaphysical modality is not S5, and, in particular, that the B axiom is false. Dummett's argument against B, however, is invalid. I show that although there are number of ways to repair Dummett's argument against B, each requires a controversial metaphysical or semantic commitment, and that, regardless of this, the case against B is undermotivated. Dummett's case is still of interest, however, as if his assumptions are correct, S5 has to go, with the natural culprit being S4. | ||
| 655 | 7 | |a Article | |