Morgenbesser's coin and counterfactuals with true components
Is A & C sufficient for the truth of 'if A were the case, C would be the case'? Jonathan Bennett thinks not and produces a putative counterexample. But I argue that anyone who accepts the case of Morgenbesser's coin, as Bennett does, should reject Bennett's counterexample. Mo...
Main Author: | |
---|---|
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
2009-11.
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Get fulltext |
LEADER | 00860 am a22001213u 4500 | ||
---|---|---|---|
001 | 355641 | ||
042 | |a dc | ||
100 | 1 | 0 | |a Walters, Lee |e author |
245 | 0 | 0 | |a Morgenbesser's coin and counterfactuals with true components |
260 | |c 2009-11. | ||
856 | |z Get fulltext |u https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/355641/1/Morgenbesser%2527s%2520Coin.doc | ||
520 | |a Is A & C sufficient for the truth of 'if A were the case, C would be the case'? Jonathan Bennett thinks not and produces a putative counterexample. But I argue that anyone who accepts the case of Morgenbesser's coin, as Bennett does, should reject Bennett's counterexample. Moreover, I show that the principle underlying Bennett's counterexample is unmotivated and indeed false. More generally, I argue that Morgenbesser's coin commits us to the sufficiency of A & C for the truth of the corresponding counterfactual. | ||
655 | 7 | |a Article |