Morgenbesser's coin and counterfactuals with true components

Is A & C sufficient for the truth of 'if A were the case, C would be the case'? Jonathan Bennett thinks not and produces a putative counterexample. But I argue that anyone who accepts the case of Morgenbesser's coin, as Bennett does, should reject Bennett's counterexample. Mo...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Walters, Lee (Author)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2009-11.
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Online Access:Get fulltext
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520 |a Is A & C sufficient for the truth of 'if A were the case, C would be the case'? Jonathan Bennett thinks not and produces a putative counterexample. But I argue that anyone who accepts the case of Morgenbesser's coin, as Bennett does, should reject Bennett's counterexample. Moreover, I show that the principle underlying Bennett's counterexample is unmotivated and indeed false. More generally, I argue that Morgenbesser's coin commits us to the sufficiency of A & C for the truth of the corresponding counterfactual. 
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