Delinquent networks
Delinquents are embedded in a network of relationships. Each delinquent decides in a noncooperative way how much delinquency effort he will exert. We characterize the Nash equilibrium and derive an optimal enforcement policy, called the key-player policy. We then extend our characterization of optim...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2010-01.
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Get fulltext |
| LEADER | 01084 am a22001453u 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | 339641 | ||
| 042 | |a dc | ||
| 100 | 1 | 0 | |a Ballester, Coralio |e author |
| 700 | 1 | 0 | |a Calvo-Armengol, Antonio |e author |
| 700 | 1 | 0 | |a Zenou, Yves |e author |
| 245 | 0 | 0 | |a Delinquent networks |
| 260 | |c 2010-01. | ||
| 856 | |z Get fulltext |u https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/339641/1/pdf | ||
| 520 | |a Delinquents are embedded in a network of relationships. Each delinquent decides in a noncooperative way how much delinquency effort he will exert. We characterize the Nash equilibrium and derive an optimal enforcement policy, called the key-player policy. We then extend our characterization of optimal single player network removal to optimal group removal,the key group. We also characterize and derive a policy that targets links rather than players. Finally, we endogenize the network connecting delinquents by allowing players to join the labor market instead of committing delinquent offenses. The key-player policy turns out to be much more complex because it depends on wages and on the structure of the network. | ||
| 655 | 7 | |a Article | |