Optimal payments in dominant-strategy mechanisms for single-parameter domains
We study dominant-strategy mechanisms in allocation domains where agents have one-dimensional types and quasilinear utilities. Taking an allocation function as an input, we present an algorithmic technique for finding optimal payments in a class of mechanism design problems, including utilitarian an...
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2013-02-22.
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Get fulltext Get fulltext |
| LEADER | 01156 am a22001573u 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | 336512 | ||
| 042 | |a dc | ||
| 100 | 1 | 0 | |a Naroditskiy, Victor |e author |
| 700 | 1 | 0 | |a Polukarov, Maria |e author |
| 700 | 1 | 0 | |a Jennings, Nicholas R. |e author |
| 245 | 0 | 0 | |a Optimal payments in dominant-strategy mechanisms for single-parameter domains |
| 260 | |c 2013-02-22. | ||
| 856 | |z Get fulltext |u https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/336512/1/main.pdf | ||
| 856 | |z Get fulltext |u https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/336512/2/a4-naroditskiy.pdf | ||
| 520 | |a We study dominant-strategy mechanisms in allocation domains where agents have one-dimensional types and quasilinear utilities. Taking an allocation function as an input, we present an algorithmic technique for finding optimal payments in a class of mechanism design problems, including utilitarian and egalitarian allocation of homogeneous items with nondecreasing marginal costs. Our results link optimality of payment functions to a geometric condition involving triangulations of polytopes. When this condition is satisfied, we constructively show the existence of an optimal payment function that is piecewise linear in agent types. | ||
| 655 | 7 | |a Article | |