Optimal payments in dominant-strategy mechanisms for single-parameter domains
We study dominant-strategy mechanisms in allocation domains where agents have one-dimensional types and quasilinear utilities. Taking an allocation function as an input, we present an algorithmic technique for finding optimal payments in a class of mechanism design problems, including utilitarian an...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2013-02-22.
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Get fulltext Get fulltext |
| Summary: | We study dominant-strategy mechanisms in allocation domains where agents have one-dimensional types and quasilinear utilities. Taking an allocation function as an input, we present an algorithmic technique for finding optimal payments in a class of mechanism design problems, including utilitarian and egalitarian allocation of homogeneous items with nondecreasing marginal costs. Our results link optimality of payment functions to a geometric condition involving triangulations of polytopes. When this condition is satisfied, we constructively show the existence of an optimal payment function that is piecewise linear in agent types. |
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