Taxed Congestion Games with Failures

In this paper, we introduce and study Taxed Congestion Games with Failures [TCGFs], extending congestion games with failures [CGFs] to consider costly task submission. We define TCGFs, and prove that TCGFs possess a pure strategy equilibrium. Moreover, we provide an efficient algorithm for the compu...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Penn, Michal (Author), Polukarov, Maria (Author), Tennenholtz, Moshe (Author)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2009.
Subjects:
Online Access:Get fulltext
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100 1 0 |a Penn, Michal  |e author 
700 1 0 |a Polukarov, Maria  |e author 
700 1 0 |a Tennenholtz, Moshe  |e author 
245 0 0 |a Taxed Congestion Games with Failures 
260 |c 2009. 
856 |z Get fulltext  |u https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/267885/1/TCGF_revised_6Dec2008.pdf 
520 |a In this paper, we introduce and study Taxed Congestion Games with Failures [TCGFs], extending congestion games with failures [CGFs] to consider costly task submission. We define TCGFs, and prove that TCGFs possess a pure strategy equilibrium. Moreover, we provide an efficient algorithm for the computation of such equilibrium. We also provide a specialized, simpler, algorithm for the case in which all resources are identical. 
655 7 |a Article