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01511 am a22001453u 4500 |
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263274 |
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|a Gerding, E. H.
|e author
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|a van Bragt, D. D. B.
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|a La Poutre, J. A.
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|a Multi-Issue Negotiation Processes by Evolutionary Computation, Validation and Social Extensions
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|c 2003-08.
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|z Get fulltext
|u https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/263274/1/kluwer.pdf
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|a e describe a system for bilateral negotiations in which artificial agents are generated by an evolutionary algorithm (EA). The negotiations are governed by a finite-horizon version of the alternating-offers protocol. Several issues are negotiated simultaneously. We first analyse and validate the outcomes of the evolutionary system, using the game-theoretic subgame-perfect equilibrium as a benchmark. We then present two extensions of the negotiation model. In the first extension agents take into account the fairness of the obtained payoff. We find that when the fairness norm is consistently applied during the negotiation, agents reach symmetric outcomes which are robust and rather insensitive to the actual fairness settings. In the second extension we model a competitive market situation where agents have multiple bargaining opportunities before reaching the final agreement. Symmetric outcomes are now also obtained, even when the number of bargaining opportunities is small. We furthermore study the influence of search or negotiation costs in this game.
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