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10.5840-faithphil20191125134 |
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220511s2019 CNT 000 0 und d |
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|a 07397046 (ISSN)
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| 245 |
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|a What is the value of faith for salvation? A thomistic response to kvanvig
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| 260 |
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|b Philosophy Documentation Center
|c 2019
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|z View Fulltext in Publisher
|u https://doi.org/10.5840/faithphil20191125134
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|a Jonathan Kvanvig has proposed a non-cognitive theory of faith. He argues that the model of faith as essentially involving assent to propositions is of no value. In response, I propose a Thomistic cognitive theory of faith that both avoids Kvanvig's criticism and presents a richer and more inclusive account of how faith is intrinsically valuable. I show these accounts of faith diverge in what they take as the goal of the Christian life: personal relationship with God or an external state of affairs. For this reason, more seriously, the non-cognitivist project likely requires rejecting traditional Christianity and its picture of salvation. © 2016 ICE Publishing. All rights reserved.
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|a Rooney, J.D.
|e author
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|t Faith and Philosophy
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