What is the value of faith for salvation? A thomistic response to kvanvig
Jonathan Kvanvig has proposed a non-cognitive theory of faith. He argues that the model of faith as essentially involving assent to propositions is of no value. In response, I propose a Thomistic cognitive theory of faith that both avoids Kvanvig's criticism and presents a richer and more inclu...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Philosophy Documentation Center
2019
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| Online Access: | View Fulltext in Publisher |
| Summary: | Jonathan Kvanvig has proposed a non-cognitive theory of faith. He argues that the model of faith as essentially involving assent to propositions is of no value. In response, I propose a Thomistic cognitive theory of faith that both avoids Kvanvig's criticism and presents a richer and more inclusive account of how faith is intrinsically valuable. I show these accounts of faith diverge in what they take as the goal of the Christian life: personal relationship with God or an external state of affairs. For this reason, more seriously, the non-cognitivist project likely requires rejecting traditional Christianity and its picture of salvation. © 2016 ICE Publishing. All rights reserved. |
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| ISBN: | 07397046 (ISSN) |
| DOI: | 10.5840/faithphil20191125134 |