WISDOM, PIETY, AND SUPERHUMAN VIRTUE

This article moves between Aristotle, Maimonides, and the Stoics. Aristotle's moral taxonomy, outlined in NE 7.1, appears problematic, given his view that, in the sphere of moral virtue, the intermediate (temperance, courage) is the extreme, and there is no excess of temperance or courage. This...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Frank, D. (Author)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: University of Illinois Press 2019
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Online Access:View Fulltext in Publisher
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520 3 |a This article moves between Aristotle, Maimonides, and the Stoics. Aristotle's moral taxonomy, outlined in NE 7.1, appears problematic, given his view that, in the sphere of moral virtue, the intermediate (temperance, courage) is the extreme, and there is no excess of temperance or courage. This is hard to square with the moral agent whom he describes as possessed of "hyperbolic" (hyperbole, excessive) virtue. As Aristotle has very little to say about the latter, I turn to Maimonides and the Stoics for clarification and enlightenment. © 2019 University of Illinois. All rights reserved. 
650 0 4 |a Aristotle 
650 0 4 |a Maimonides 
650 0 4 |a Piety 
650 0 4 |a Stoics 
650 0 4 |a Virtue 
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773 |t History of Philosophy Quarterly