Leader selection and service delivery in community groups: Experimental evidence from Uganda

In developing countries, NGOs and governments often rely on local groups for the delivery of financial and public services. This paper studies how the design of rules used for group leader selection affects leader identity and shapes service delivery. To do so, we randomly assign newly formed saving...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Deserranno, E. (Author), Stryjan, M. (Author), Sulaiman, M. (Author)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: American Economic Association 2019
Online Access:View Fulltext in Publisher
LEADER 01251nam a2200157Ia 4500
001 10.1257-app.20180248
008 220511s2019 CNT 000 0 und d
020 |a 19457782 (ISSN) 
245 1 0 |a Leader selection and service delivery in community groups: Experimental evidence from Uganda 
260 0 |b American Economic Association  |c 2019 
856 |z View Fulltext in Publisher  |u https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20180248 
520 3 |a In developing countries, NGOs and governments often rely on local groups for the delivery of financial and public services. This paper studies how the design of rules used for group leader selection affects leader identity and shapes service delivery. To do so, we randomly assign newly formed savings and loan groups to select their leaders using either a public discussion procedure or a private vote procedure. Leaders selected with a private vote are found to be less positively selected on socioeconomic characteristics. This results in groups that are more inclusive toward poor members, without being less economically efficient. © 2019 American Economic Association. 
700 1 |a Deserranno, E.  |e author 
700 1 |a Stryjan, M.  |e author 
700 1 |a Sulaiman, M.  |e author 
773 |t American Economic Journal: Applied Economics