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01191nam a2200157Ia 4500 |
| 001 |
10.1111-joie.12204 |
| 008 |
220511s2019 CNT 000 0 und d |
| 020 |
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|a 00221821 (ISSN)
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| 245 |
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|a Anticompetitive Vertical Merger Waves
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| 260 |
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|b Blackwell Publishing Ltd
|c 2019
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| 856 |
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|z View Fulltext in Publisher
|u https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12204
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| 520 |
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|a We develop a model of vertical merger waves and use it to study the optimal merger policy. As a merger wave can result in partial foreclosure, it can be optimal to ban a vertical merger that eliminates the last unintegrated upstream firm. Such a merger is more likely to worsen market performance when the number of downstream firms is large relative to the number of upstream firms, and when upstream contracts are non-discriminatory, linear and public. On the other hand, the optimal merger policy can be non-monotonic in the strength of synergies or in the degree of downstream product differentiation. © 2020 The Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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|a Hombert, J.
|e author
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|a Pouyet, J.
|e author
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| 700 |
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|a Schutz, N.
|e author
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| 773 |
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|t Journal of Industrial Economics
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