The Legacy and the Tyranny of Time: Exit and Re-Entry of Sovereigns to International Capital Markets

We use a continuous-time Weibull model (without and) with a change-point in duration dependence to investigate the duration of the exit and re-entry of sovereigns to international markets. We find that, as the reputation of debtor countries as good (bad) borrowers solidifies over time, those episode...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Agnello, L. (Author), Castro, V. (Author), Sousa, R.M (Author)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Blackwell Publishing Inc. 2018
Subjects:
C41
G15
Online Access:View Fulltext in Publisher
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020 |a 00222879 (ISSN) 
245 1 0 |a The Legacy and the Tyranny of Time: Exit and Re-Entry of Sovereigns to International Capital Markets 
260 0 |b Blackwell Publishing Inc.  |c 2018 
856 |z View Fulltext in Publisher  |u https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.12474 
520 3 |a We use a continuous-time Weibull model (without and) with a change-point in duration dependence to investigate the duration of the exit and re-entry of sovereigns to international markets. We find that, as the reputation of debtor countries as good (bad) borrowers solidifies over time, those episodes are more likely to end—the “legacy of time.” Debtor countries take advantage of the “benefit of doubt” of creditors during short exits. When exits are long and the reputation as a bad borrower emerges, no more “complacency” makes it more difficult to borrow again in international markets—the “tyranny of time.”. © 2018 The Ohio State University 
650 0 4 |a C41 
650 0 4 |a change-point 
650 0 4 |a continuous-time Weibull model 
650 0 4 |a duration dependence 
650 0 4 |a G15 
650 0 4 |a international capital markets 
650 0 4 |a re-entry and exit 
700 1 |a Agnello, L.  |e author 
700 1 |a Castro, V.  |e author 
700 1 |a Sousa, R.M.  |e author 
773 |t Journal of Money, Credit and Banking