Political contestability and public contract rigidity: An analysis of procurement contracts
Are public contracts less adaptable than private contracts? Using a comprehensive set of contracts for a standard product, we compare procurement contracts in which the procurer is either a public administration or a private corporation. We find that public-to-private contracts feature more rigidity...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Blackwell Publishing Inc.
2019
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View Fulltext in Publisher |
| Summary: | Are public contracts less adaptable than private contracts? Using a comprehensive set of contracts for a standard product, we compare procurement contracts in which the procurer is either a public administration or a private corporation. We find that public-to-private contracts feature more rigidity clauses than private-to-private contracts and that the use of rigidity clauses in public contracts rises when political risks are more salient. We argue that a significant part of the increased rigidity of public contracts is a contractual adaptation to limit political hazards from political opponents and interested third parties. © 2018 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. |
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| ISBN: | 10586407 (ISSN) |
| DOI: | 10.1111/jems.12268 |