DO BETTER INFORMED INVESTORS ALWAYS DO BETTER? A BUYBACK PUZZLE

We explore the value of private investment information using data from a singular source: auctions of yearling racehorses. Horse breeders possess superior information about their own horses and have strong financial incentives to buy the best of these back at auction. However, those they repurchase...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Boyle, G. (Author), Ward, G. (Author)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Blackwell Publishing Inc. 2018
Online Access:View Fulltext in Publisher
LEADER 01261nam a2200145Ia 4500
001 10.1111-ecin.12688
008 220706s2018 CNT 000 0 und d
020 |a 00952583 (ISSN) 
245 1 0 |a DO BETTER INFORMED INVESTORS ALWAYS DO BETTER? A BUYBACK PUZZLE 
260 0 |b Blackwell Publishing Inc.  |c 2018 
856 |z View Fulltext in Publisher  |u https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12688 
520 3 |a We explore the value of private investment information using data from a singular source: auctions of yearling racehorses. Horse breeders possess superior information about their own horses and have strong financial incentives to buy the best of these back at auction. However, those they repurchase subsequently perform significantly worse on average, earning 30% less at the racetrack than horses purchased by outsiders. Moreover, this underperformance is concentrated in male horses, despite these being purchased exclusively for racing purposes. These puzzling findings cannot be explained by differences in horse risk or breeder abilities, or by nonfinancial objectives, or by behavioral or selection biases. (JEL G02, G11, G14, L83, D44). © 2018 Western Economic Association International 
700 1 |a Boyle, G.  |e author 
700 1 |a Ward, G.  |e author 
773 |t Economic Inquiry