Maximizing Social Welfare and Agreement Via Information Design in Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian Games

Information design in an incomplete information game involves a designer that aims to influence players' actions through signals generated from a designed probability distribution to optimize its objective function. For quadratic design objective functions, if the players have quadratic p...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Eksin, C. (Author), Khazaei, H. (Author), Sezer, F. (Author)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2023
Subjects:
Online Access:View Fulltext in Publisher
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020 |a 00189286 (ISSN) 
245 1 0 |a Maximizing Social Welfare and Agreement Via Information Design in Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian Games 
260 0 |b Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.  |c 2023 
300 |a 8 
856 |z View Fulltext in Publisher  |u https://doi.org/10.1109/TAC.2023.3270241 
856 |z View in Scopus  |u https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85159720324&doi=10.1109%2fTAC.2023.3270241&partnerID=40&md5=8d255ee082415e482215fa81d937bd1b 
520 3 |a Information design in an incomplete information game involves a designer that aims to influence players' actions through signals generated from a designed probability distribution to optimize its objective function. For quadratic design objective functions, if the players have quadratic payoffs that depend on the players' actions and an unknown payoff-relevant state, and signals on the state that follow a Gaussian distribution conditional on the state realization, the information design problem is a semidefinite program (SDP) [1]. In this note, we seek to characterize the optimal information design analytically by leveraging the SDP formulation, when the design objective is to maximize social welfare or the agreement among players' action. We show that full information disclosure maximizes social welfare when there is a common payoff state, the payoff dependencies among players' actions are homogeneous, or when the signals are public. When the objective is to maximize the agreement among players' actions, not revealing any information is optimal. When the objective is a weighted combination of social welfare and agreement terms, we establish a threshold weight below which full information disclosure is optimal under public signals for games with homogeneous payoffs. Numerical results corroborate the analytical results, and identify partial information disclosure structures that are optimal. IEEE 
650 0 4 |a Game 
650 0 4 |a Game theory 
650 0 4 |a Games 
650 0 4 |a Gaussian distribution 
650 0 4 |a information design 
650 0 4 |a Information design 
650 0 4 |a Information disclosure 
650 0 4 |a Linear programming 
650 0 4 |a Linear-programming 
650 0 4 |a Probability distribution 
650 0 4 |a Probability: distributions 
650 0 4 |a semidefinite programming 
650 0 4 |a Semi-definite programming 
650 0 4 |a Social agreement 
650 0 4 |a Social welfare 
650 0 4 |a Structural optimization 
650 0 4 |a Symmetric matrices 
650 0 4 |a Uncertainty 
650 0 4 |a Wireless networks 
700 1 0 |a Eksin, C.  |e author 
700 1 0 |a Khazaei, H.  |e author 
700 1 0 |a Sezer, F.  |e author 
773 |t IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control