Strategic news releases in equity vesting months

We find that CEOs release 20% more discretionary news items in months in which they are expected to sell equity, predicted using scheduled vesting months. These vesting months are determined by equity grants made several years prior and thus unlikely to be driven by the current information environme...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Edmans, A. (Author), Goncalves-Pinto, L. (Author), Groen-Xu, M. (Author), Wang, Y. (Author)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Oxford University Press 2018
Online Access:View Fulltext in Publisher
LEADER 01298nam a2200169Ia 4500
001 10.1093-rfs-hhy070
008 220706s2018 CNT 000 0 und d
020 |a 08939454 (ISSN) 
245 1 0 |a Strategic news releases in equity vesting months 
260 0 |b Oxford University Press  |c 2018 
856 |z View Fulltext in Publisher  |u https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhy070 
520 3 |a We find that CEOs release 20% more discretionary news items in months in which they are expected to sell equity, predicted using scheduled vesting months. These vesting months are determined by equity grants made several years prior and thus unlikely to be driven by the current information environment. The increase arises for positive news, but not neutral or negative news, nor nondiscretionary news. News releases fall in the month before and month after the vesting month. News in vesting months generates a temporary increase in stock prices and market liquidity, which the CEO exploits by cashing out shortly afterwards. © The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. 
700 1 |a Edmans, A.  |e author 
700 1 |a Goncalves-Pinto, L.  |e author 
700 1 |a Groen-Xu, M.  |e author 
700 1 |a Wang, Y.  |e author 
773 |t Review of Financial Studies