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01751nam a2200289Ia 4500 |
| 001 |
10.1093-restud-rdy048 |
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220511s2019 CNT 000 0 und d |
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|a 00346527 (ISSN)
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| 245 |
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|a Community enforcement of trust with bounded memory
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| 260 |
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|b Oxford University Press
|c 2019
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| 856 |
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|z View Fulltext in Publisher
|u https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdy048
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|a We examine how trust is sustained in large societies with random matching, when records of past transgressions are retained for a finite length of time. To incentivize trustworthiness, defaulters should be punished by temporary exclusion. However, it is profitable to trust defaulters who are on the verge of rehabilitation. With perfect bounded information, defaulter exclusion unravels and trust cannot be sustained, in any purifiable equilibrium. A coarse information structure, that pools recent defaulters with those nearing rehabilitation, endogenously generates adverse selection, sustaining punishments. Equilibria where defaulters are trusted with positive probability improve efficiency, by raising the proportion of likely re-offenders in the pool of defaulters. © The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
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|a Bounded memory
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|a Credit markets
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|a design
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|a equilibrium
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|a financial market
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| 650 |
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|a Imperfect monitoring
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| 650 |
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|a Information design
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| 650 |
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|a local participation
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|a monitoring
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|a probability
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|a Repeated games with community enforcement
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|a Trust game
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|a Bhaskar, V.
|e author
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|a Thomas, C.
|e author
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| 773 |
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|t Review of Economic Studies
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